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Abstract 
We examined the psychological and behavioral consequences of making a communication 
error in expressive crisis negotiations and instrumental suspect interviews. During crisis 
negotiation (N=133) or suspect interview (N=68) training, Dutch police and probation officers 
received preparation material that led them to make either a factual, judgment, or no error. Across 
both studies, errors increased officers’ negative affect, with errors leading to more stress in crisis 
negotiations and more distraction in suspect interviews. When comparing factual to judgment 
errors, factual errors led to more distraction in crisis negotiations and more negative affect in 
suspect interviews. Analysis of the transcribed dialogues identified four categories of response: 
apologize, exploration, deflect, and no-alignment. Of these, negotiators used all four regularly, 
while interviewers predominantly used exploration and deflect. Our findings revealed the 
potentially negative effects of errors on officers and offered insights into how they could best 
focus to induce an appropriate response.  
Keywords: Communication errors, response strategies, error management, suspect 
interview, crisis negotiation. 
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Communication Error Management in Law Enforcement Interactions: A Sender’s 
Perspective 
Errors can have important consequences for those working in safety-critical interactions 
such as crisis negotiations and suspect interviews. However, most studies of these interactions 
have focused on positive behaviors and their role in fostering rapport (Alison, Alison, Noone, 
Eltnib, & Christiansen, 2013; Donohue & Roberto, 1993) and cooperation (Giebels & Taylor, 
2009; Richardson, Taylor, Snook, Conchie, & Bennell, 2014). Fewer studies have considered 
negative behaviors and, in particular, what happens when an officer makes a mistake. An 
exception is Oostinga, Giebels, and Taylor’s (2018a; 2018b) demonstrations that communication 
errors occur often and have effects on trust, the relationship, and information provision. However, 
their work did not consider the psychological effects errors have on the error maker (i.e., sender). 
If we better understand officers’ internal state after recognizing their error, then we can develop 
evidence-based training and prepare them for when this situation occurs. 
In this paper, we investigated the effect of factual errors (use of a wrong name or date) 
and judgment errors (misrepresentation of feelings of a receiver) on the interactions that occur as 
part of an expressive crisis negotiation (Study 1) and an instrumental oriented suspect interview 
(Study 2). Both types of interactions are time sensitive, high-pressure interactions with large 
amount of unverified information, making erring inevitable. Yet, crisis negotiators are seeking 
information to provide care and help, while suspect interviewers have a more instrumental goal of 
gathering information (Beune, Giebels, & Taylor, 2010; Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005). 
These different foci may impact the error sender’s psychological and behavioral reactions. 
Following Oostinga et al. (2018a), we defined communication error management as a 
four-stage process: (1) the law enforcement officer utters a message; (2) the suspect judges the 
message to contain an error; (3) the suspect (in)directly addresses the error; and, (4) the law 
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enforcement officer realizes the error and responds. To investigate this process and the effects on 
the error sender, we developed and implemented a prototypical communication training exercise 
in which we let law enforcement officers unwittingly make a mistake and examined their 
cognition, affect and behavior. At the cognitive level, we explored the extent to which officers 
perceive stress or distraction after the making an error, since research shows that errors can 
influence focus (Dimitrova, van Dyck, van Hooft, & Groenewegen, 2014). At an affective level, 
we examined the extent to which officers felt negative affect (i.e., self-oriented anger, shame and 
guilt) after making an error, since research suggests errors can trigger negative emotions 
(Rybowiak, Garst, Frese, & Batinic, 1999). At a behavioral level, we analyzed the type of 
responses officers used following the error, since research suggests that cognitive and affective 
states may interfere with a sender’s communicative flexibility (Benoit, 2013; Keith & Frese, 
2005).  
Crisis Negotiations and Suspect Interviews in the Netherlands 
Every police region in the Netherlands uses trained crisis negotiators to respond to 
reported suicide, kidnap, or hostage situations. Being a crisis negotiator is a part-time role that 
officers combine with other responsibilities, which can range from police detective to manager. 
Moreover, there are general police officers that have received extra training of how to respond 
when a crisis arises, and they are first at the scene. The same is broadly true for prison 
negotiators. Every state prison has specialized-trained personnel that respond when a crisis occurs 
in the prison itself. In both contexts, the goal of the officers is to achieve behavioral change of the 
suspect with the lowest physical threat possible. They are trained to achieve this by using open 
questions and active listening to acquire information (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004). 
Every police region in the Netherlands uses trained police interviewers to elicit 
information from suspects. The focus on eliciting information, rather than seeking confessions, is 
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core to the Dutch approach, which is very much driven by the investigative interviewing model 
(Vrij, 2010). Officers training discourages the use of pressure tactics and focuses on 
communication skills that build trust and rapport to gather information. 
Errors in Law Enforcement Interactions 
The effectiveness of building a trusting relationship to gather information in law 
enforcement interactions is well documented (Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Walsh & Bull, 2012). 
Far less research focuses on what law enforcement officers do when something goes wrong in 
this process. However, in this and other domains, such as corporate brand crisis and leadership 
studies, research has suggested the importance of developing our knowledge of errors. For 
example, Thoroughgood, Sawyer, and Hunter (2013) have shown that leader errors may 
undermine a trusting relationship with (perceptions of leader task and relationship competence) 
and cooperation of (desire to work for the leader) their subordinates. 
In interviews with experienced crisis negotiators, Oostinga et al. (2018a) found that errors 
may usefully be distinguished into three forms: factual, judgment and contextual error. A factual 
error occurs when negotiators convey the wrong information, such as using the wrong name. A 
judgment error occurs when the social or ethical issues surrounding the message are not 
appropriate, such as when the negotiator makes an inappropriate joke. A contextual error occurs 
when something goes wrong in the police practices, such as when equipment malfunctions and 
inhibits communication. The first two types of errors focus on the negotiation’s actors rather than 
the procedure, and so they have been the focus of most research (and our focus here).  
According to studies of organizational error making, one consequence of errors is that 
they lead to distraction and negative emotions (Rybowiak et al., 1999). This is true even when the 
consequences of the error are routine and far from the threat to life experienced in hostage crises. 
For example, in their study of 1155 observed errors by clerical employees, Brodbeck et al. (1993) 
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showed that the amount of time spent on errors is positively related to emotional strain. Of the 
available organizational research, none distinguishes between factual or judgment errors nor does 
it consider whether these affect an error sender differently. Yet, there is good reason to anticipate 
differences. Oostinga et al. (2018b) showed that errors in suspect interviews have a detrimental 
effect on the trust (i.e., a cognitive effect) and rapport (i.e., an affective effect) experienced by the 
suspect. From a law enforcement officer’s perspective, communication errors may have a 
negative influence on the sender because they jeopardize his or her goal of building a trusting 
relationship with the suspect to provide care and help. Furthermore, Oostinga et al. (2018b) found 
that judgment errors have a more negative effect on suspect’s cognitive and affective experience 
when compared to factual errors. This may be the result of a judgment error being seen as an ego 
threat by the suspect, as they perceive that they are not being taken seriously (Ren & Gray, 2009). 
We therefore predicted that, from a sender’s perspective, judgment errors will be perceived as 
being more problematic than factual errors as they put more at stake: 
H1a: Officers who make a judgment or factual error experience more stress, distraction, 
and negative affect, compared to those making no error. 
H1b: Officers making of a judgment error will experience more stress, distraction, and 
negative affect than those making a factual error. 
Response Strategies in Law Enforcement Interactions 
People differ in their responses to errors (Benoit, 2013). Recently, Oostinga et al. (2018b) 
assessed how responses influence the cognition (affective trust), affect (rapport and hostility) and 
behavior (willingness to provide information) of recipients. They compared three strategies self-
identified by negotiators: contradict (denying responsibility), apologize (taking responsibility), 
and accept (taking responsibility and assuring prevention). They found that contradict decreases 
rapport from the perspective of the receiver, while accept reconciles it to the level of no error 
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made. Apologize seems more effective for affective trust and rapport in crisis negotiation, while 
accept seems more effective for the willingness to provide information in a suspect interview. 
What this and other research shows is that, to respond in a way that reconciles the 
relationship with the other party, officers should address what did not align with the suspect 
(Benoit, 2013). Yet, when someone is distracted, they often have no cognitive capacity to 
recognize the consequences of their behavior, affecting their capacity to respond appropriately 
(Weiner, 1985). Their focus may be on the self and who is responsible, leading to a response that 
aligns more with the sender’s focus and feelings and an evasion of responsibility. Moreover, in 
their study of self-regulation in error management training, Keith and Frese (2005) showed that 
training in cognitive-attentional focus or emotion control, led trainees to show more flexibility 
when presented with new problems compared to trainees who received error avoidance training. 
Thus, law enforcement officers should be more flexible in responding to the communication error 
they have made and provide a solution to the problem, rather than seek to avoid it at all costs. 
Consequently, we hypothesized that: 
H2a: A decrease in the law enforcement officer’s experienced stress, distraction, and 
negative affect leads to the use of an apologize or accept over a contradict response. 
H2b: An increase in the law enforcement officer’s experienced stress, distraction, and 
negative affect leads to the use of a contradict over an apologize or accept response. 
Study 1 
Study 1 assessed the effect of errors on a law enforcement officer’s cognition and affect 
and how this influences their error response, in an expressive interaction. Because we were 
interested in the effect of errors on officer’s psychological and behavioral responses, we decided 
to take an experimental approach with professional crisis negotiators and mock suspects. This 
enabled us to focus on the relationship between the psychological impact and behavioral 
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responses of the law enforcement officer, while controlling for external influences. Negotiators 
were asked to prepare a negotiation and their preparation material led them to make one of two 
errors: factual (actor was instructed that the character had a different name) or judgment (actor 
was instructed that the character did not want to be addressed by the first name). We compared 
their data with a control condition in which no error was made.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 64 (42.1%) crisis negotiators from correctional institutions 
(e.g., State prisons), 38 (25.0%) police trainee crisis negotiators, and 50 (32.9%) police officers 
taking a training course taught in Dutch. The correctional negotiators receive a 1-day course 
every six months at their training institute, in which negotiating skills are learned and refreshed. 
The police officers undertake a specialized course lasting 3 weeks, which is provided by the 
police academy and includes a test for proficiency. The police officer’s crisis communication 
course is voluntary training provided by the police academy in which police officers learn how to 
best react as a first responder to a crisis incident. Because our definition of communication error 
management required the error sender (the negotiator) to (in)correctly use the name of the 
suspect, 18 negotiators (1 control, 6 factual, and 11 judgment) who did not use the name were 
excluded from further analysis. One other negotiator was excluded because he failed to fill out 
the post-experiment questionnaire. Of the remaining 133 negotiators, 106 were male (79.9%), 
their mean age was 39.9 years (SD = 8.5), and they had worked as a crisis negotiator in a 
correctional institution or with the police for 11.8 years on average (SD = 7.7, Range: 1 month - 
36 years). 
Measures. The original design also included a pre-negotiation 9-item questionnaire 
adapted from Rybowiak et al. (1999) to determine participants’ orientation toward error 
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management vs. error prevention. Participants completed this questionnaire at least 1 day before 
the training and they were unaware of its connection with the training. However, analysis showed 
high scores on error management and low scores on error prevention, and no significant effects 
on stress, distraction or negative affect. A possible explanation for this result is that negotiators 
sought to demonstrate on the questionnaire the job skills that they had mastered. Therefore, 
reporting that you are good in managing errors could have been a tactical decision of the 
negotiators. Consequently, we decided to remove these factors from further analysis. 
Negotiator’s cognition and affect. A post-experiment questionnaire required negotiators 
to self-report several different aspects of their experience. They were first asked for open 
responses to three questions: ‘How did you experience the conversation?’, ‘What did you 
perceive to be positive?’, and ‘What did you perceive to be negative?’ They were then asked to 
respond on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) to five items, each measuring a different 
construct: ‘To what extent did you feel tension after using the wrong name?’ (stress); ‘To what 
extent did you get distracted from the job after using the wrong name?’(distraction); ‘To what 
extent were you angry at yourself after using the wrong name?’ (self-oriented anger); ‘To what 
extent did you feel shame after using the wrong name?’ (shame), and ‘To what extent did you 
feel guilt after using the wrong name?’ (guilt). We counter-balanced the order of asking to what 
extent they felt guilty and shameful, to overcome any order effects (Niedenthal, Tagney, & 
Gavanski, 1994). We used single item measures because of time constraints, recognizing that 
many constructs can be adequately captured with one item (Fuchs & Diamantopoulos, 2009).  
Of the five items, three (anger, shame and guilt) ostensibly measured different aspects of 
negative affect. Pairwise correlations among these items were high (Range r(131) = .55 - .68, p < 
.001), and a Principle Components factor analysis on the three items revealing one underlying 
factor (based on Eigenvalues greater than 1) that explained 74.32% of the variance. 
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Consequently, we decided to create a negative affect scale by averaging the scores on these three 
items, which showed high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .83). A higher score on this scale 
means that the negotiator experienced more negative affect. 
Procedure. Negotiators undertook a prototypical role-play exercise often used during 
training sessions (Van Hasselt, Romano, & Vecchi, 2008), using a scenario adapted from 
Giebels, Oostinga, Taylor, and Curtis (2017). We consulted training staff of the Dutch crisis 
negotiation course and the prison negotiators course to make the scenario as realistic as possible. 
None of the participants refused to participate, as the experiment was presented as being part of 
their training course. The police negotiators’ task, which was to negotiate via telephone with the 
suspect, was described as follows (information for prison negotiators between brackets):  
Jaap Verhoeven barricaded himself in a room at the police academy (visiting area of the 
prison) with a knife. Jaap has threatened to commit suicide. Jaap only wants to talk to a 
negotiator. So far, no further information is known. The second negotiator is on his/her 
way but is delayed. You will have to start on your own. Goal: make contact, stabilize the 
situation, build a relationship, and – if possible – gain information and provide solutions 
to end this situation.  
The instruction about a second negotiator was necessary because negotiations are often 
carried out in pairs (Noesner, 1999). The negotiators are, however, trained to start the negotiation 
once they arrive at the scene (even if the second negotiator is not present), as contact distracts the 
suspect from the reason why he/she was there in the first place and makes them focus on the 
negotiator. We decided to let the negotiators perform alone in this instance to enable an analysis 
of their error response without interference from a second negotiator.  
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Having read the information, the negotiator was asked to contact the suspect over the 
phone. The suspect was situated in another room, had received the same instructions as the 
negotiator, was instructed to behave as naturally as possible, and give standardized reactions. The 
instruction also included a background story that accounted for his presence at the scene. That is, 
he wanted to become a negotiator but was not allowed to take part, as he was not a police officer 
(prison guard) and was there to put the negotiators under pressure to let him enter the course. The 
people who played the role of suspect were highly experienced actors who are trained to play 
these types of roles. The negotiation was ended after 5 minutes. We decided to focus on the first 
5 minutes because this time is important for creating a first impression and may set the scene for 
the remaining interaction (Wells, Taylor, & Giebels, 2013). It also ensured the interactions were 
comparable (i.e., level of the relationship, no interference of a second person). After the 
negotiation, the negotiator was told that the role-play was over and that we were interested in 
their reflective observations about the negotiation. They then completed the post-experiment 
questionnaire and were debriefed. This study was approved by the ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Behavioral, Management and Social Sciences of the University of Twente. 
Error manipulation. Each negotiator was assigned to one of the three error conditions: 
factual, judgment or control. All negotiators received the same instruction, with the suspect’s 
name being Jaap Verhoeven (see information above). By contrast, the instruction received by the 
suspect differed by condition and determined the type of error that the negotiator made. In the 
factual error condition, the suspect was told that his name was André rather than Jaap. Once the 
negotiator used the name Jaap, the suspect was instructed to respond with the sentence: ‘No, you 
are not talking to Jaap!’ In the judgment error condition, we instructed the suspect that his name 
was Jaap and that he did not want to be addressed by his first name, but by his surname Mr. 
Verhoeven. Once the negotiator used the name Jaap, he was instructed to respond with the 
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sentence: ‘How dare you call me Jaap!’ In the factual error condition, the negotiator used the 
inaccurate information that was provided and in the judgment error condition the negotiator took 
the wrong manner of addressing the suspect. As such, the negotiators made the mistake 
themselves and were not instructed to do so. In the control condition, we instructed the suspect 
that his name was Jaap and if the negotiator used the name to respond with the sentence: ‘Yes, 
my name is Jaap!’  
We decided to use the suspect’s name for our error manipulation for three reasons. First, 
negotiators are trained to use the first name to contact a suspect. Thus, it was highly likely that 
the negotiators would use the name at some point. Second, it was possible to encourage 
negotiators to use the name by frequently using the name in the scenario instructions. Third, 
evidence from several domains highlights the importance of name to identity and behavior 
(Seeman, 1980), suggesting misnaming can be consequential. 
Response coding. The first author and an independent coder read verbatim transcripts of 
each speaking turn after the pre-determined response of the suspect. The coders could not be held 
blind to the experimental condition but both coders were blind to the negotiator’s scores on the 
cognition and affect measures and the second coder was blind to the hypotheses. Since we had no 
prior expectation for the effects of the experimental condition (i.e., the type of errors) on the used 
response strategy this could not have led to confirmation bias. They independently identified four 
different forms of error response: apologize, exploration, deflect, and no alignment. In an initial 
coding, one coder had classified six types, but they could be re-classified in the four overarching 
types when was decided to only focus on the literal response and not on interpreting the meaning 
of the message. Apologize was an addressing response in which the negotiator took responsibility 
(e.g., ‘I want to apologize for that’). Exploration was an inquiring response in the form of a 
question or remark (e.g., ‘What is your name then?’). Deflect was an attributing response in the 
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form of a question or remark (e.g., ‘Oh, they must have misinformed me’). No alignment was an 
unrelated response in which the negotiator said something completely off-topic (e.g., ‘I am a 
crisis negotiator’). Note that our codes bear similarity to those used by Oostinga et al. (2018a, 
2018b). The first author and a second independent coder who was instructed on the classification 
coded all the messages. Out of the 99 responses, 23 included a combination of responses. 
Specifically, the one’s that used an apology combined this with deflect (n = 5), exploration (n = 
7), no alignment (n = 7), and a combination of deflect and no alignment (n = 1). We also found a 
couple of exploration and no alignment combinations (n = 3). For the analysis, a response was 
assigned to the category that was most prevalent in the response. This resulted in excellent inter-
rater agreement (Cohen’s κ = .81). The few disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis. Table 1 presents the Means, SDs, and zero-order correlations 
among the study variables. As expected, Table 1 shows high correlations between the cognition 
measures of stress and distraction, and negative affect.  
[TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
Hypothesis testing. Error effects. Table 2 presents the negotiator’s cognition and affect 
as a function of communication error. To test our predictions that the making of a judgment or 
factual error by a negotiator leads to more stress, distraction, and negative affect compared to the 
making of no errors (H1a) and this effect will be stronger for a judgment error than a factual error 
(H1b), we conducted a one-way MANOVA with communication errors as the Independent 
Variable and the three cognition and affect measures as the Dependent Variables. There was a 
significant multivariate effect of error type, F(6, 258) = 5.66, p < .001, with negotiators reporting 
significant differences in stress, F(2, 132) = 7.30, p < .001, η2 = .10, distraction, F(2, 132) = 5.31, 
p = .01, η2 = .08, and negative affect, F(2, 132) = 13.64, p < .001, η2 = .17. 
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Since the sample sizes varied per condition, we have decided to take the Welch’s t-test 
instead of the Students t-test throughout the paper (Delacre, Lakens, & Leys, 2017). In 
comparison to the control condition, the making of a factual error led to more stress, t(79.74) = 
3.36, p < .001, d = .74, 95% CI [.29, 1.19], distraction, t(66.80) = 2.95, p < .001, d = .65, 95% CI 
[.20, 1.09], and negative affect, t(83.82) = 5.66, p < .001, d = 1.25, 95% CI [.77, 1.72]. A set of 
equivalent effects were found when comparing a judgment error to control, as it led to more 
stress, t(75.23) = 3.82, p < .001, d = .74, 95 %CI [.28, 1.19], and negative affect, t(74.88) = 5.10, 
p < .001, d = 1.15, 95% CI [.67, 1.62]. There was, however, no difference in the amount to which 
the negotiator got distracted, t < 0.98. Interestingly, the making of a factual error did lead to more 
distraction in comparison to a judgment error, t(96.85) = 2.34, p = .02, d = .47, 95% CI [.07, .87]. 
There were no significant differences in stress and negative affect, both t’s < 0.39. 
 [TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
Enacted response strategies. Negotiators used the response strategy exploration the most 
frequent (n = 42), followed by apologize (n = 28), no alignment (n = 16), and deflect (n = 13). To 
test our predictions regarding the effects of negotiator’s stress, distraction, and negative affect on 
response type (H2a and H2b), we computed binary logistic regressions in which stress, 
distraction, and negative affect were predictors for each of the four response strategies (coded as 
binary Dependent Variables, 0 = not used, 1 = used; one regression per response strategy). Table 
3 presents the results of these regressions. As can be seen from Table 3, the full models for 
predicting apologize, exploration, and deflect were all significant, but the model for predicting no 
alignment was not. Consistent with H2a, both stress, Wald χ2 = 4.11, p = .04, and distraction, 
Wald χ2 = 5.50, p = .02, were significant predictors of negotiators’ apologizing, with negotiators 
more likely to use an apologize response when they experienced more stress and less distraction. 
Similarly, stress was a predictor of exploration, Wald χ2 = 4.96, p = .03, with negotiators using an 
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exploration response more often when they experienced less stress. In partial support of H2b, 
negative affect was a significant negative predictor of deflect, Wald χ2 = 6.68, p = .01, with 
negotiators using more deflect responses when they experienced less negative affect.  
[TABLE 3 NEAR HERE] 
Additional analysis. Although we did not predict specific associations between type of 
error and type of response, it was interesting to explore whether such relationships were present. 
Consequently, we performed a chi-square test and a significant relationship could be found 
between error type (factual vs. judgment) and first response, X2 (3, n = 99) = 10.36, p = .02. 
Follow-up analyses showed that this effect was mainly driven by the use of apologize and no 
alignment responses. That is, negotiators were more likely to use an apologize response after a 
judgment error than after a factual error (U = 989.0, p = .04, r = .21), while the reverse was true 
for the use of a no alignment response (U = 1044.0, p = .05, r = .20). No significant differences 
were found for the use of exploration or deflect. 
Discussion 
As predicted, our analyses demonstrated that making a communication error leads to more 
stress and negative affect, and that this influenced the kind of response used by a negotiator. 
Specifically, more stress and less distraction were associated with an apologize response, while 
less stress was associated with an exploration response. This separation of responses corroborates 
the notion that primitive forms of coping tend to occur when greater threat is perceived, while 
problem-focused coping arises when perceived threat is lower (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
What we did not assess in this study, however, is the effect of the other’s party response 
on the enacted response. We would have expected that negative responses to the negotiator would 
strengthen the effects we observed. Moreover, we asked the negotiators to self-report on how the 
error affected their cognition and affect, but we did this after their behavior. We tried to 
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overcome this shortcoming by asking how they felt directly after the error, but it remains unclear 
what came first. It will be useful to invest effort in identifying a methodology that allows the 
causality to be disentangled, but, as with other areas of cognitive and affect research (Bagozzi, 
1982), doing so is likely to prove a challenge. 
One unexpected finding in our data was that factual errors were reported as more 
distracting than judgment errors. Our extra analysis provided some insight into this effect, since 
after a factual error, negotiators were more likely to use an explorative response. This suggests 
that negotiators put their specialized negotiator role aside and started to adopt a more evidence-
gathering (i.e., interviewer) mode of interaction. By switching from a relational to evidence-
orientated communicative frame (Taylor, 2002; Taylor & Donald, 2007), the error sender may try 
to understand what went wrong and provide viable solutions for why the error occurred in the 
first place. They also likely reduce the chance that the other party feels personally attacked 
(Giebels & Taylor, 2009). Those who did not engage in information gathering adopted a no 
alignment response – this response occurred more after a factual error compared to a judgment 
error – which showed the direct consequence of distraction. These findings are interesting when 
viewed in the context of Oostinga et al.’s (2018b) evidence that an error receiver’s perceptions 
and subsequent behaviors are determined in part by how law enforcement officers respond to 
their error. If the negotiator perceives the impact of an error as more or less significant than 
experienced by the suspect him or herself, this may have a direct impact on whether the 
appropriate response is being used or not. It would, therefore, be interesting to further disentangle 
how the effects of errors on suspects are perceived by the negotiator and whether this estimation 
has a direct impact on how they respond to their errors. 
The explanation offered up an interesting hypothesis about how the law enforcement 
officer’s role influenced their error reactance. That is, if they focus on information gathering to 
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providing care and help, they may take a more relational approach, while if they focus on 
information gathering to detect crime, they may adhere to a more evidence-gathering format. It 
would be interesting to see whether the dispersion of the enacted response strategies is similar in 
an interaction that is focused solely on information gathering to detect crime. In the light of the 
previous findings, one would expect that in this context the use of an exploration response was 
more prevalent. 
Study 2 
Considering the possible contextual dynamics identified above, the goal of Study 2 was to 
replicate the findings of Study 1 and build upon it in four ways. First, we assessed an interaction 
in which the law enforcement officer has a different focus, to determine generalizability. Second, 
we sought to provide better insights into the psychological and behavioral effects of errors on the 
senders by asking them to imagine what the effect of their errors was on the other side. We 
expected them to perceive the consequences of judgment errors as more detrimental than factual 
errors, as that was the perception of the receiver (Oostinga et al., 2018b). We hypothesized: 
H3a: Officers making a judgment or factual error will report lower affective and cognitive 
trust perceptions, and rapport of the suspect, compared to those making no error. 
H3b: The predicted impact of communication errors will be greater for a judgment error 
compared to a factual error. 
Third, we manipulated whether the suspect was cooperative or non-cooperative after 
receiving a response. In a suspect interview, the law enforcement officer wants to build a trusting 
relationship to make the suspect talk and provide information. We expected that when a suspect 
is non-cooperative after he/she has received an error with response strategy of the law 
enforcement officer, the negative effect of their error is more pronounced. We hypothesized: 
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H4: The effect of an error on the officer’s experienced stress, distraction, and negative 
affect will be stronger when a suspect is non-cooperative compared to cooperative. 
Fourth, following the critique of Study 1, we added an unobtrusive observation of the error 
sender’s direct error reaction by measuring their electrodermal activity (EDA) during the 
interaction. Changes in EDA have been shown to correlate with changes in the activity of the 
sympathetic nervous system (SNS; Critchley, 2002), which is responsible for a person’s fight or 
flight response. Consequently, EDA is used as an index of stress and cognitive load (Ströfer, 
Noordzij, Ufkes, & Giebels, 2015).  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 70 police officers from two police stations in the 
Netherlands who perform suspect interviews in their job. Two interviewers from the factual 
condition who did not make the intended error (i.e., they did not use any name) were excluded 
from analysis. Of the remaining 68 interviewers, 50 were male (73.5%), their mean age was 
41.2yrs (SD = 11.0), they had an average interviewing experience of 13.4yrs (SD = 9.7, Range: 1 
month - 42 years), and they reported interviewing approximately 3.16 hours per week (SD = 3.93, 
Range 1– 25 hours). One-third (32.4%) reported having received specialized interview training. 
Measures. Negotiator’s cognition and affect. We included the same post-experiment 
measures as in Study 1. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, we found significant correlations 
between our three negative affect items, r’s(66) = 0.25 - 0.66, p = .04, and a principal 
components analysis (based on Eigenvalues greater than 1) revealed one underlying factor, 
explaining 62.62% of the variance. We thus again created a negative affect scale by averaging the 
scores on these three items (Cronbach’s α = .70). 
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Electrodermal activity (EDA). We recorded exosomatic EDA with an alternating current 
using an Empatica E4 wristband on the non-dominant wrist of the interviewer. An EDA signal 
consists of two distinct levels: tonic and phasic EDA. Since the making of a communication error 
is a discriminative event in the interaction, we assessed the phasic response directly after the error 
(Setz et al., 2010). To extract the phasic from the tonic EDA signal, we executed a Continuous 
Decomposition Analysis using Ledalab (Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010). To control for individual 
variation in skin conductance, we subtracted the mean phasic EDA (2-12 seconds after they had 
received the response from the suspect on the error) from the mean phasic EDA during the 
baseline measurement (minutes 2-7). For two participants, we had to take the baseline after 30 
seconds, as we did not have a baseline that was long enough otherwise. We found high 
fluctuations in the amplitude sum of our EDA measurement, Range: -0.54-7.49 μS (cf. Ströfer, 
Ufkes, Noordzij, & Giebels, 2016). Our analyses were thus performed on log-transformed data, 
but the reported statistics in Table 4 were based on raw data in μS.  
Perceptions suspect. We added three items to the post-experiment questionnaire to 
measure the extent to which interviewers could imagine how the suspect experienced receiving 
the error. Specifically, they were asked to respond on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) 
to three items, each measuring a different construct: ‘The suspect thought that I was good in 
empathizing when I used the wrong name’ (affective trustworthiness); ‘The suspect perceived me 
as being competent when I used the wrong name’ (cognitive trustworthiness); and, ‘The suspect 
judged our relationship to be positive when I used the wrong name’ (rapport). A higher score on 
these items meant that the interviewer perceived the suspect to experience respectively more 
cognitive trust, affective trust, and rapport.  
Procedure. Interviewers took part at work in a study from the University of Twente that 
“focused on the difference between interviewing alone and together.” The participants were 
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recruited by a police officer contact and asked to take part the same day. Approximately half of 
the potential participants declined taking part due to the other work commitments. They were told 
the wristband “measured their feelings” in order to obscure precisely what was being measured. 
The experiment required interviewers to role-play a face-to-face interview with a suspect of a 
mock theft. The role-play scenario, which was based on the work of Beune, Giebels, and Sanders 
(2009), was provided to interviewers in a police report that was formatted in accordance with 
police guidelines. In the scenario, Jaap Verhoeven was suspected of stealing €200 from the 
University of Twente. During a study on food habits that took place at the police academy in 
which Jaap participated, the suspect had seen the opportunity to steal the money from the closet 
in the room of the researcher. The report included information on the available evidence, 
including the statement of a witness who had seen the suspect near the closet. It was the task of 
the interviewer to gather information and determine whether Jaap was guilty. The interviewer had 
10 minutes to read the file information, while the Empatica E4 was already attached to establish 
the baseline of their EDA.  
After the 10-minutes preparation time, the interviewer was asked to enter the interviewing 
room, which was a room used for actual suspect interviews in which the suspect (an experienced 
actor) was already sat. The actor was unaware of the study’s goal, had received background 
information on the case, and was instructed to behave naturally and give standardized reactions. 
Moreover, the actor was instructed that the character had committed the theft but only wanted to 
confess if he felt the need to do so. Because of the nature of the error, the interviewer made the 
error at the beginning of the interaction, which means he or she had yet to familiarize themselves 
with the suspect’s natural behavior. All interviews were audio recorded and ended by the 
experimenter after 5 minutes. After the interview, interviewers filled in the post-interview 
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questionnaire and were debriefed. This study was approved by the ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Behavioral, Management and Social Sciences of the University of Twente. 
Error and stance manipulation. Each interviewer was assigned to one of the three error 
conditions: factual, judgment or control. The factual and control condition replicated Study 1. 
The judgment error related to formality in tone and received from the suspect the response ‘How 
dare you address me formally!’ We had decided to change the judgment error manipulation in the 
interviews from a formal to informal tone, as interviewers are trained to use the surname instead 
of the first name once contacting a suspect in their interviews. After the error was made, the 
interviewer would either receive a cooperative or non-cooperative response. In the former, the 
suspect replied with the sentence ‘No problem, that also happens to me every now and then’ and 
in the latter the suspect sighed and replied, ‘I don’t care about your interview.’ 
Response coding. Using verbatim transcripts of each interview, the first author read the 
responses and classified them using the same categories as Study 1 (i.e., apologize, exploration, 
deflect, and no alignment). The same independent coder as used in Study 1 also classified the 
four different forms of responses. The coders were blind to the interviewer’s scores on the 
cognition and affect measures and the second coder was blind to the hypotheses. Out of the 49 
responses, 2 included a combination of responses. Specifically, they both combined exploration 
and no alignment. We assigned each response to whatever category that was most prevalent 
within the response, and this resulted in an excellent level of inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s κ = 
.80). All disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
Results 
Preliminary analysis. Table 4 presents the Means, SDs, Cronbach alphas, and zero-order 
correlations among the study variables. As expected, and in line with patterns found in Study 1, 
Table 4 shows high correlations between the cognition measures of stress and distraction, and 
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negative affect. In addition, there are negative correlations between the cognition and affect 
measures, and what interviewers anticipated as the suspect’s perceptions of affective trust, 
cognitive trust, and rapport. Surprisingly, there was no significant correlation between EDA and 
the self-reported stress and distraction measures, but they were all positive. 
[TABLE 4 NEAR HERE] 
Hypothesis testing. Error effects. Table 2 presents the interviewer’s cognition and affect 
as a function of communication error. To test our predictions that the making of a judgment or 
factual error by an interviewer leads to more stress, distraction, and negative affect compared to 
the making of no errors (H1a), and that this effect will be stronger for a judgment error than a 
factual error (H1b), we conducted a one-way MANOVA with communication errors as the 
Independent Variable and the three cognition and affect measures as the Dependent Variables. 
There was a significant multivariate effect of error type, F(6, 128) = 4.48, p < .001, with 
interviewers reporting significant differences in stress, F(2, 67) = 4.30, p = .02, η2 = .12, 
distraction, F(2, 67) = 10.19, p < .001, η2 = .24, and negative affect, F(2, 67) = 11.27, p < .001, η2 
= .26. 
In comparison to the control condition, the making of a factual error led to more stress, 
t(39.55) = 3.05, p < .001, d = .94, 95% CI [.30, 1.57], distraction, t(40.85) = 4.45, p < .001, d = 
1.37, 95% CI [.69, 2.03], and negative affect, t(25.62) = 5.41, p < .001, d = 1.66, 95% CI [.90, 
2.40]. A set of equivalent effects with lesser magnitude were found when comparing a judgment 
error to control, as it led to more distraction, t(41.13) = 3.74, p < .001, d = 1.14, 95% CI [.49, 
1.78], and negative affect, t(28.32) = 3.58, p < .001, d = 1.09, 95% CI [.42, 1.74], but there was 
no significant difference in stress, t(40.86) = 1.80, p = .08, d = .55, 95% CI [-.06, 1.15]. In 
comparison to a judgment error, the making of a factual error led to more negative affect, t(44.19) 
= 2.04, p = .05, d = .58, 95% CI [.01, 1.15], but there was no significant difference in stress and 
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distraction, t < 1.22. To test the outcomes of our EDA measurement, we conducted a one-way 
ANOVA with communication errors as the Independent Variable and by using EDA as the 
Dependent Variable. There was no significant difference in EDA, F(2,67) = 0.55, p = .58, η2 = 
.02. 
Enacted response strategies. Table 3 presents the regression coefficients of the enacted 
response strategies as a function of the interviewer’s cognition and affect. In contrast to the 
previous study, the interviewers predominantly used the exploration (n = 30) and deflect (n = 14) 
response strategies (apologize, n = 2, and no alignment, n = 3). To test our predictions that 
interviewers’ stress, distraction, and negative affect effected their choice of response (H2a and 
H2b), we computed binary logistic regressions in which stress, distraction, and negative affect 
were predictors for each of the four response strategies (coded as binary Dependent Variables, 0 
= not used, 1 = used). We did this for the exploration and deflect, but not for the apologize and no 
alignment response strategies. That is, because the number of interviewers using that strategy 
were very low and no reliable estimations could be made. As can be seen from Table 3, the full 
models for predicting exploration and deflect were not significant. In contrast with H2a and H2b, 
stress, distraction and negative affect were not significant predictors for exploration and deflect. 
To test the outcomes of our EDA measurement, we performed binary logistic regressions with 
EDA as predictor and the two response strategies exploration and deflect as binary Dependent 
Variables (0 = not used, 1 = used). The full model of predicting exploration was non-significant, 
X2 (1, N = 49) = 0.34, p = .56, and explained 0.9% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance. The full 
model of predicting deflect was also non-significant, X2 (1, N = 49) = 0.12, p = .73, and 
explained 0.3% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance.  
Error effects on other party. Table 5 presents interviewers’ mean responses to the 
questions regarding the expected suspect perceptions, as a function of communication error. To 
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test our predictions that error type will affect perceptions of how the suspect will feel (H3a and 
H3b), we conducted a one-way MANOVA with communication errors as the Independent 
Variable and the three suspect perception measures as the Dependent Variables. There was a 
significant multivariate effect of error type, F(6, 128) = 5.46, p < .001, with interviewers 
reporting significant differences in affective trust, F(2, 67) = 11.87, p < .001, η2 = .27, cognitive 
trust, F(2, 67) = 6.75, p < .001, η2 = .17, and rapport, F(2, 67) = 11.01, p < .001, η2 = .25. In 
comparison to the control condition, the making of a factual error led to less perceived affective 
trust, t(34.95) = -4.13, p < .001, d = -1.27, 95% CI [-1.93, -.59], cognitive trust, t(39.56) = -4.84, 
p < .001, d = -1.49, 95% CI [-2.16, -.79], and rapport, t(38.06) = -4.85, p < .001, d = -1.49, 95% 
CI [-2.17, -.79]. A set of equivalent effects with lesser magnitude were found when comparing a 
judgment error to control, as it led to less perceived affective trust, t(38.15) = -2.12, p = .04, d = -
0.65, 95% CI [-1.26, -.03], and rapport, t(40.99) = -3.32, p < .001, d = -1.01, 95% CI [-1.64, -
.37], but there was no significant difference in cognitive trust, t < 1.32. In comparison to a 
judgment error, the making of a factual error led to less cognitive trust, t(46.91) = -3.49, p < .001, 
d = -1.00, 95% CI [-1.59, -.40], but there was no significant difference in affective trust and 
rapport, both t’s < 1.84. 
[TABLE 5 NEAR HERE] 
Error effects on and stance of other party. Table 6 presents interviewers’ mean reported 
cognition and affect as a function of communication error and stance. To test whether our stance 
manipulation worked, we compared the stance across the expected suspect perceptions. In 
comparison to the cooperative suspect (n = 25), the non-cooperative suspect (n = 24) led to lower 
perceptions of affective trust (M = 2.21, SD = 0.83 vs. M = 3.00, SD = 0.82), t(46.82) = -3.36, p < 
.001, d = -0.96, 95% CI [-1.55, -.36], and rapport (M = 1.88, SD = 0.68 vs. M = 2.60, SD = 0.87), 
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t(45.24) = -3.27, p < .001, d = -0.93, 95% CI [-1.52, -.34], but there was no significant difference 
in cognitive trust (M = 2.17, SD = 0.92 vs. M = 2.48, SD = 1.05), t < 1.12.  
To test our prediction that the impact of an error on interviewers’ experienced stress, 
distraction, and negative affect, is stronger when the suspect is non-cooperative compared to 
cooperative (H5), we conducted a two-way MANOVA with communication errors and stance as 
the Independent Variables and the three cognition and affect measures as the Dependent 
Variables. We found no significant interaction effect for communication errors and stance, F(3, 
43) = 0.97, p = .41. To test the outcomes of our EDA measurement, we conducted a two-way 
ANOVA with communication errors and stance as the Independent Variables and EDA as the 
Dependent Variable. We found no significant interaction effect for communication error and 
stance, F(1,45) = 0.55, p = .46. 
[TABLE 6 NEAR HERE] 
Additional analysis. Although we did not predict specific associations between type of 
error and type of response, it was interesting to explore whether such a relationship was present. 
Consequently, we performed a chi-square test and a significant relationship could be found 
between error type (factual vs. judgment) and first response, X2 (3, n = 49) = 10.22, p = .02. 
Follow-up analyses showed that this effect was mainly driven by the use of exploration and 
deflect. That is, negotiators were more likely to use an exploration response after a factual error 
than after a judgment error (U = 170.0, p < .01, r = .44), while the reverse was true for the use of 
deflect (U = 205.5, p = .02, r = .35). No significant differences were found for the use of apology 
and no alignment. 
General Discussion 
This is the first empirical study of communication errors in law enforcement interactions 
from the perspective of the error sender. Our findings suggest that the negative effects of 
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communication errors occur irrespective of context. However, and contrary to what research on 
the receiver side suggests (Oostinga et al., 2018b), the effects of a factual error appeared more 
severe than those of a judgment error. A possible explanation for this finding may be sought in 
how officers perceive a factual mistake. Unlike a judgment error, they may perceive that their 
professional integrity is at stake, since they appear to have used the incorrect information. That 
the interviewers of Study 2 reported a perception that factual errors harm cognitive trust of the 
suspect supports this account. It suggests that it is not so much the impact of the error on the 
other party that is important, but rather the effect of making the error on the officer’s perceived 
reputation. Another possible explanation is that errors of judgment are encountered more 
regularly by officers and that, through experience, they have learned what to ‘let pass’ and when 
to act (Williams, 1999). It would be interesting to test the impact of other forms of errors to see 
whether a reputation or experience-based account is driving the effects we observed (for 
examples of other errors, see Oostinga et al., 2018a). To further decipher this effect, it may be 
fruitful to include a measure that determines how the sender perceives the receiver after an error 
is being made. This may explain whether the sender sees the error as a threat to their reputation 
and experiences responsibility for it, or whether it takes the receiver to question and deflect 
responsibility to them. To further decipher the influence of such cognitive inferences, future 
research should also include a measure that determines how the sender perceives the receiver 
after an error is being made. That is, both the judgment and factual error may signal that the 
suspect is just being obstinate. In particular, a judgement error may also trigger inferences of the 
suspect’s sensitivity to hierarchy/equality or the existence of identity issues. The relative 
importance of such attributions may explain why some officers primarily see the error as a threat 
to their reputation and experience responsibility for it, while others are more inclined to deflect 
responsibility to the suspect. 
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Our findings reveal interesting associations between response strategies and the cognition 
and affect of the negotiators. Specifically, the more stress and less distraction, the more 
negotiators apologized; the more stress, the more negotiators reacted with exploration; and the 
less negative affect the more negotiators used deflect (Study 1). Yet, we did not find these effects 
in the suspect interview setting (Study 2). A possible explanation can be sought in the different 
range of responses used across these settings. Negotiators used all four responses regularly, while 
interviewers predominantly used exploration and deflect. This may reflect the difference in role 
of officers in these two types of interaction. A crisis negotiator focuses on information gathering 
to provide care and help, while a suspect interviewer is predominantly focusing on information 
gathering to detect crime. The negotiator was talking to a suicidal person which may have led to a 
more submissive approach (e.g., use of apologize), while the suspect interviewer did not have to 
take this high risk into account and may therefore have taken a more dominant approach (e.g., use 
of deflect). This may also explain why we found a higher percentage of combined strategies in 
the crisis negotiation setting (approximately 25%), while we only found a few combinations of 
responses in the interview setting (approximately 4%). This finding appears to show that crisis 
negotiators use different options to make the other party feel at ease, while the interviewers take a 
certain approach and want to continue with the interview. Further research should examine 
whether role differences explain the contrasting responses. 
In terms of the effectiveness of the response, the receiver studies from Oostinga et al. 
(2018b) suggest that accepting responsibility is important for error reconciliation in both type of 
interactions. That is, the apologize response reflects the taking of full responsibility for the error, 
while this is arguably less so for exploration, and not at all the case for the deflect and no 
alignment responses (Oostinga et al., 2018a). Apparently, taking responsibility was something 
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that law enforcement officers do not do automatically. Study 1 provided some insights into why 
this may occur. The findings suggest experiencing a negative internal state is necessary to drive a 
responsibility-taking response to communication errors. This again corroborated earlier findings 
of Oostinga et al. (2018a; 2018b) showing that, when law enforcement officers see errors solely 
as a form of feedback, this may lead to insensitivity.  
Remarkably, we did not find a relationship between the self-reported stress, distraction 
(form of cognitive load) and EDA in our correlational analyses and no significant results for our 
EDA measurement of Study 2. A possible explanation for not finding these effects may be sought 
in the large fluctuations in our results. Although we controlled for individual differences by using 
a baseline measurement, the results within the conditions still varied immensely, which may have 
kept us from finding any effects. For future studies, it would be useful to use a within-subject 
paradigm in which people act appropriately and make errors within the same interaction.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The current studies are not without limitations, and we consider four below. First, we 
ended the conversations after 5 minutes and there was no second negotiator/interviewer present, 
which may raise some ecological validity concerns. That is, the impact of an error may be 
different once the interaction partners have established a stronger relationship and the impact of 
an error may be lowered if the law enforcement officer knows that someone else is present to 
intervene. Yet, assessing this time frame and the response of one law enforcement officer made 
the interactions comparable (i.e., level of the relationship, no interference of a second person) and 
consequently allowed us to assess the direct impact of the communication error on the error 
sender. A logical next step would be to assess the impact of errors on the error sender over time, 
and the extent to which a second law enforcement officer would moderate the effects we found. 
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Second, we used single-item scales and have found a relatively low alpha level for our 
negative affect scale in Study 2, which may have led to measurement error. The number of 
participants in our second study was also low, which increased the risk of low power being 
responsible for the absence of a significant result for H4. Nonetheless, our results did provide an 
interesting first exploration on communication error management by law enforcement officers. 
Critically, the reason for the participant numbers in our second study was that some did not have 
the time to participate. This reinforces the delicate balance we needed to strike between 
methodologically sound research and participation of practitioners. The larger number of 
participants in Study 1 shows, however, that performing experiments within a training setting can 
be a fruitful approach. 
 Third, our coding took the most prevalent response strategy in the first speaking turn after 
the pre-determined response, but officers did sometimes combine responses and they may include 
additional response strategies in subsequent speaking turns. Arguably, the fact that multiple 
coders achieved excellent coding reliability suggests that most responses did have a dominant 
strategy as a first response. But, given evidence that the effects of a response can be altered at a 
word-by-word (Borkin & Reinhart, 1978) and component level (Kirchoff, Wagner, & Strack, 
2012), it would be interesting to further disentangle the facets of a response and test whether or 
not officers change strategies ‘mid-flow’ if they are perceiving them as ineffective. This analysis 
might include examining multiple ‘levels’ of a type of error to test the extent to which an error’s 
consequence increases in a linear way with error severity. 
Fourth, we focused on law enforcement officers from the Netherlands. Yet, how people 
handle errors differs across countries. For example, German leaders tend to score higher on error 
prevention than Dutch leaders (Van Dyck et al., 2005). If we extrapolate from this finding to our 
law enforcement officers, it suggests the impact of a communication error may be more 
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pronounced for German officers than for Dutch officers, which may in turn effect the way they 
repair their error. It would be interesting, to test how these findings translate to people from other 
cultural backgrounds. 
Conclusion 
Law enforcement officers face the unexpected all the time, so preparing them for 
something unexpected is crucial. Our paradigm, which was designed as a prototypical exercise 
for training, provided useful input for such preparation. It showed that factual errors and 
judgment errors have differential impacts depending on context, and officer training may now 
prioritize its lessons toward the more disruptive type. Our results provide some first input on 
what recovery strategies to focus on when providing training in communication errors. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-Correlations Among Study Variables in Study 1 (N = 
133) 
Variablesa M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Genderb 1.20 0.40      
2. Age 39.92 8.47 -.21*     
3. Experiencec  11.78 7.72 .01 .42*    
4. Stress  2.35 0.99 -.01 -.12 .03   
5. Distraction   1.89 0.92 .06 -.10 -.09 .36*  
6. Negative affectd  1.69 0.79 .03 -.01 .06 .63* .26* 
a The scales stress, distraction and negative affect, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these 
scales means that the negotiator experienced more stress, distraction and negative affect. 
b 1 = Male, 2 = Female, c n = 131, * p < .05, d Cronbach’s α = .83 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Law Enforcement Officer’s Cognition and Affect as a 
Function of Communication Error in Study 1 (N = 133) and Study 2 (N = 68) 
 Communication errors 
 Control 
(n = 34) 
Factual 
(n = 52) 
Judgment 
(n = 47) 
Study 1 Negotiator’s cognition and affecta M SD M SD M SD 
Stress  1.82 0.83 2.50b 1.02 2.57b 0.93 
Distraction  1.59 0.96 2.19b,c 0.89 1.79c 0.83 
Negative affect  1.13 0.49 1.86b 0.71 1.90b 0.87 
Study 2 Interviewer’s cognition and affecta  (n = 19) (n = 24) (n = 25) 
Stress  1.79 0.92 2.67b 0.96 2.32 1.03 
Distraction 1.63 0.83 2.96b 1.12 2.64b 0.95 
Negative affect 1.04 0.15 1.85b,c 0.72 1.47b,c 0.58 
a The scales stress, distraction and negative affect, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these 
scales means that the law enforcement officer experienced more stress, distraction and negative 
affect. 
b Differs significantly from control, p < .05. 
c Differs significantly from the other communication error, p < .05. 
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Table 3 
Regression, Standard Deviations, and Odds Ratios of Coefficients for the Enacted Response Strategy as a Function of Law Enforcement 
Officer’s Cognition and Affect in Study 1 (n = 99) and Study 2 (n = 49) 
 Response strategies 
 Apologize 
(n = 28)a 
Exploration 
(n = 42)b 
Deflect 
(n = 13)c 
No alignment 
(n = 16)d 
Study 1 Crisis negotiator’s 
cognition and affectg B SE B Exp b B SE B Exp b B SE B Exp b B SE B Exp b 
Constant -1.07 0.77  0.07 0.66  -0.27 1.10  -3.13* 0.97  
Stress 0.66* 0.33 1.94 -0.71* 0.32 0.49 0.44 0.43 1.56 -0.08 0.41 0.93 
Distraction  -0.79* 0.34 0.46 0.11 0.27 1.11 0.19 0.39 1.21 0.65 0.34 1.91 
Negative affect  -0.03 0.37 0.97 0.63 0.35 1.87 -1.92* 0.74 0.15 0.14 0.43 1.15 
Study 2 Interviewer’s 
cognition and affectg 
   (n = 30)e (n = 14)f    
Constant    0.48 1.02  -0.27 1.10     
Stress    -0.18 0.35 0.83 0.14 0.37 1.15    
Distraction    -0.10 0.36 0.91 -0.03 0.38 0.97    
Negative affect    0.43 0.51 1.54 -0.57 0.57 0.57    
* p < .05. a X2 (3, n = 99) = 8.28, p = .04, R2 = 0.12, b X2 (3, n = 99) = 5.98, p = .11, R2 = 0.08, c X2 (3, n = 99) = 10.36, p = .02, R2 = 0.18, d X2 (3, 
n = 99) = 4.64, p = .20, R2 = 0.08, e X2 (3, n = 49) = 0.99, p = .80, R2 = 0.03, f X2 (3, n = 49) = 1.24, p = .74, R2 = 0.04 (Nagelkerke).  
g The scales stress, distraction and negative affect, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these scales means that the law enforcement officer 
experienced more stress, distraction and negative affect. 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-Correlations Among Study Variables in Study 2 (N = 68) 
Variablesa M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Genderb 1.26 0.44          
2. Age 41.18 11.04 -.19         
3. Experiencec  13.41 9.71 -.12 .59*        
4. Stress 2.29 1.02 .02 .05 -.08       
5. Distraction 2.47 1.11 -.01 .04 -.21 .49*      
6. Negative affectd 1.48 0.64 -.07 .16 -.20 .36* .53*     
7. Cognitive trust  2.54 1.00 .01 .07 .28* -.25* -.30* -.43*    
8. Affective trust 2.79 0.86 -.01 -.03 -.02 -.20 -.24* -.40* .50*   
9. Rapport 2.53 0.95 -.02 .07 .12 -.24 -.27* -.43* .59* .65*  
10. EDA 0.59 1.33 -.16 .04 -.05 .18 .04 -.02 -.21 .04 .08 
a The scales stress, distraction, negative affect, cognitive trust and rapport, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these scales means that the 
suspect interviewer experienced more stress, distraction, negative affect and perceived the suspect to experience more cognitive trust, affective 
trust and rapport. 
b 1 = Male, 2 = Female c n = 65, * p < .05, d Cronbach’s α = .70 
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Table 5  
Means and Standard Deviations for Suspect Interviewer’s Expected Suspect Perceptions as a 
Function of Communication Error in Study 2 (N = 68) 
 Communication errors 
 Control 
(n = 19) 
Factual 
(n = 24) 
Judgment 
(n = 25) 
Interviewer’s expected  
suspect perceptionsa 
M SD M SD M SD 
Affective trust 3.26 0.45 2.38b 0.92 2.84b 0.85 
Cognitive trust 3.11 0.81 1.87b,c 0.85 2.76c 0.93 
Rapport 3.26 0.81 2.08b 0.78 2.40b 0.91 
a The scales affective trust, cognitive trust and rapport, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these 
scales means that the suspect interviewer perceived the suspect to experience more cognitive 
trust, affective trust and rapport. 
b Differs significantly from control, p < .05. 
c Differs significantly from the other communication error, p < .05. 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Interviewer’s Cognition and Affect as a Function of 
Communication Error and Stance in Study 2 (n = 49) 
 Error Type - Stance 
 Factual- 
Cooperative 




(n = 12) 
Judgment-
Cooperative 




(n = 12) 
Interviewer’s cognition 
and affecta 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Stress  2.58 0.97 2.75 0.97 2.31 1.03 2.33 1.07 
Distraction 3.25 1.14 2.67 1.07 2.54 1.05 2.75 0.87 
Negative affect 1.92 0.78 1.78 0.67 1.46 0.66 1.47 0.50 
a The stress, distraction and negative affect, range from 1-5 and a higher score on these scales 
means that suspect interviewer experiences more stress, distraction and negative affect. 
 
